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I.

INTRODUCTION

Before the pandemic, a defendant found incompetent to stand trial was
often stranded in jail for weeks or months as she waited for an inpatient bed
to open at a psychiatric facility.2 While there, she usually received no
*
This paper was published in December 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. All dates
and time descriptions refer to the 2020–21 COVID-19 pandemic unless otherwise stated.
** Professor of Law, Legal Practice, Georgetown University Law Center. Many thanks to
Erin Carroll, E. Lea Johnston, Jeffrey Shulman, Tom Spoth, and the participants in the
Georgetown Law summer workshop series for their helpful feedback. I am also grateful to Elise
Widerlite and the research librarians at Georgetown Law for their impeccable research assistance.
1.
Status Notice at 1, In re Misdemeanor-Charged Defendants in Competency Evaluation
or Restoration, No. 2020 CNC 000122, (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 2020).
2.
See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 1, Trueblood v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. &
Health Servs., No. 14-cv-01178 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2014); Christie Thompson, Leila Miller
& Manuel Villa, Mentally Ill and Languishing in Jail, FRONTLINE (June 6, 2019),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/incompetent-to-stand-trial-languishing-in-jail/
[https://perma.cc/EU3U-6XZY]; Susan McMahon, Reforming Competence Restoration Statutes:
An Outpatient Model, 107 GEO. L.J. 601, 609–10 (2019).
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treatment, her mental health deteriorated, and she was astonishingly likely to
be abused and neglected.3 She almost certainly came out of jail in a worse
state than she was when she went in.
The pandemic has made this desperate situation even worse. Now that wait
in jail is both longer,4 as many psychiatric facilities stopped accepting new
patients as they dealt with outbreaks or imposed social distancing measures,
and more dangerous. Jails have been the sites of some of the worst virus
outbreaks in the country.5
The solution to this problem is simple: release defendants. There is no
inherent magic to inpatient treatment that renders it superior to community
treatment. Even if community treatment is unavailable—a common problem
in many jurisdictions—it is far worse to keep a person found incompetent in
jail, where she will likely decompensate, suffer abuse or neglect, and, now,
be exposed to a pandemic, than to release her.
Pre-pandemic, judges rarely released defendants found incompetent to
stand trial for two reasons. First, many competence restoration statutes
default to the inpatient option; some even require it.6 Second, judges, like
most people, harbor deep-seated fears of individuals with mental illness, and
they are reluctant to release individuals who they suspect may be dangerous,
even if that suspicion is founded on stigma instead of fact.7
But the pandemic has forced judges’ hands, and some are opting to release
individuals who would have been slated for inpatient care and extended jail
waits pre-COVID-19. In the District of Columbia, thirty-five people in
competence proceedings were released.8 In Washington, a man charged with
robbery was ordered to inpatient treatment; after he waited over three months
3.
E.g., McMahon, supra note 2, at 613–17.
4.
See Christie Thompson, For Mentally Ill Defendants, Coronavirus Means Few Safe
Options,
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(May
15,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/15/for-mentally-ill-defendants-coronavirus-meansfew-safe-options [https://perma.cc/DS7W-FABW].
5.
E.g., Lucy Tompkins, Maura Turcotte & Libby Seline, “I Just Kind of Lost It”: As
Coronavirus Cases Soar, One Montana Town Reels, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/16/us/rural-jails-coronavirus-mountain-west.html
[https://perma.cc/3WDS-TN7Q] (noting that 300 detainees and staff had been infected in a jail
designed to hold 365 people); Timothy Williams & Danielle Ivory, Chicago’s Jail Is Top U.S.
Hot Spot as Virus Spreads Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/us/coronavirus-cook-county-jail-chicago.html
[https://perma.cc/6JB5-2E55].
6.
McMahon, supra note 2, at 627–36; see also Marisol Orihuela, The Unconstitutionality
of Mandatory Detention During Competency Restoration, 22 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 22–23
(2017).
7.
See Michael Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 401–03 (1992).
8.
See Order at app. A, B, In re Misdemeanor-Charged Defendants in Competency
Evaluation or Restoration, No. 2020 CNC 000122 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 10, 2020).
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in jail for a transfer, a judge dismissed the charge.9 While these are certainly
small numbers, they indicate an opportunity to experiment with the
decarceration of individuals found incompetent to stand trial. As the
pandemic drags on, and defendants found incompetent remain stuck in limbo,
pressure to decarcerate may continue to mount.
Thus, while the pandemic has made the already egregious lag times for
competence restoration treatment worse, it might also contain the seeds of a
solution to this intractable problem. A crisis of this proportion might be the
one thing that could shake the criminal justice system out of its assumption
that defendants should be detained while they wait for an inpatient bed to
open.
II.

COMPETENCE RESTORATION PURGATORY

Even before the pandemic, the situation for individuals found incompetent
to stand trial was bleak. Jillian White was sixty-four years old with a brain
injury and history of theft when she allegedly stole some bronze bird statues
and a patio umbrella from her neighbors and was arrested.10 At first, she was
released pending trial.11 Then she was found incompetent.12 Despite her
attorney’s pleas for outpatient placement, a judge ordered her arrested so she
could undergo treatment.13 But White was never transferred to the inpatient
facility, and nearly three months after her arrest, she died by suicide in her
jail cell.14
Jamycheal Mitchell allegedly stole snacks from a 7-Eleven and, after his
arrest, he was found incompetent to stand trial.15 Four months later, he starved
to death in his jail cell.16 Prison officials allegedly had denied him food,

9.
David Kroman, COVID-19 Leading to Illegal Jail Stays for Inmates with Mental Illness,
CROSSCUT (May 6, 2020), https://crosscut.com/2020/05/covid-19-leading-illegal-jail-staysinmates-mental-illness [https://perma.cc/XH65-8GAT].
10. Police Report at 4, 7, Pitkin Cnty. Sheriff, Deputy Report for Incident 19P014199 (July
18, 2019) (on file with author).
11. Jason Auslander, Pitkin County Jail Inmate Died by Suicide Sunday Night, Sheriff Says,
ASPEN TIMES (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.aspentimes.com/news/pitkin-county-jail-inmate-diessunday-night-investigation-underway/ [https://perma.cc/5VJG-89LY].
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Complaint at ¶ 2, Adams v. Naphcare, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 3d 1128 (E.D. Va. 2017) (No.
2:16-cv-229), 2016 WL 2865121, aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Adams v. Ferguson, 884
F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2018).
16. Id. at ¶ 102.
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turned off the water to his cell, and failed to provide him with medication to
treat his mental illness.17
After Isaac Lemelle was found incompetent, he waited nearly six months
for a transfer to a mental health facility.18 During that time, he was locked
down in the jail’s psychiatric unit, where he was only allowed out of his cell
for one hour each day and had no guaranteed time outdoors.19
These stories are not unusual. Pretrial detainees routinely wait in their jail
cells for weeks, months, or even over a year before a competence restoration
bed opens.20 They often deteriorate, suffer from abuse and neglect, or are
placed in solitary confinement during that time.21
To end up in this competence purgatory, defendants must first be found
incompetent to stand trial, meaning that they either cannot consult with their
attorneys with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or do not
understand the proceedings against them.22 Once a judge finds a defendant
incompetent, all criminal proceedings cease until her competence is
restored.23 In most cases, that restoration happens at an inpatient facility,
usually a state-run hospital.24 But those hospitals do not have nearly enough
beds to accommodate all the defendants found incompetent every year.25
Hence the lengthy delays.
In one 2017 survey, eleven states reported wait times of anywhere between
a month to more than a year for transfer to an inpatient facility.26 Lawsuits
challenged these delays, and many of those cases either settled or were
decided in the plaintiffs’ favor.27 Yet even those states with judicially
17. Id. at ¶¶ 4–5, 7, 12–13.
18. Third Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at ¶ 12, Ward ex rel.
Bourliot v. Hellerstedt, No. 1:16-cv-00917 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2017).
19. Id. at ¶ 78.
20. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS., FORENSIC PATIENTS IN STATE
PSYCHIATRIC
HOSPITALS:
1999–2016,
at
50
(2017),
https://www.nasmhpd.org/sites/default/files/TACPaper.10.Forensic-Patients-in-StateHospitals_508C_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LP2-9ZLG].
21. McMahon, supra note 2, at 613–17; see also Laura I. Appleman, Deviancy,
Dependency, and Disability: The Forgotten History of Eugenics and Mass Incarceration, 68
DUKE L.J. 417, 468–70 (2018).
22. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
23. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (a defendant found incompetent “may
not be subjected to a trial”).
24. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH DIRS., supra note 20, at 38, 47.
25. See id. at 48, 50.
26. See id. at 50.
27. See Trueblood v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1022
(W.D. Wash. 2015) (finding seven days to be the “maximum justifiable period of incarceration”);
Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring transfer within seven
days); Advoc. Ctr. for the Elderly & Disabled v. La. Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 731 F. Supp. 2d
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imposed limits on wait times continue to see delays in treatment. Washington
alone has been fined more than $83.4 million and twice been held in contempt
for its failure to adhere to a judge’s order restricting wait times.28
These long waits can end tragically. Since 2010, at least 404 people with
a mental health condition have died in America’s jails.29 Suicides claimed the
largest number of detainees; many of the other deaths resulted from abuse or
neglect.30 For an individual living with a mental health condition, a jail setting
is “at best, counter-therapeutic and, at worst, dangerous to [a detainee’s]
mental and physical well being.”31
III.

IMPACT OF COVID-19

The pandemic has now made this purgatory not only lengthier, but also
more dangerous. In the spring, hospitals stopped accepting transfers from
603, 627 (E.D. La. 2010) (requiring transfer within twenty-one days); Disability L. Ctr. v. Utah,
180 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1004, 1013 (D. Utah 2016) (denying motion to dismiss due process claim
on behalf of incompetent defendants forced to wait as much as six months for admission to state
psychiatric hospital); Terry ex rel. Terry v. Hill, 232 F. Supp. 2d 934, 938, 944 (E.D. Ark. 2002)
(concluding that the six-month average wait in Arkansas for a defendant to be admitted to the
state psychiatric hospital was “far beyond any constitutional boundary”); Settlement Agreement
at ¶ 2(a), Disability L. Colo. v. Bicha, No. 11-cv-02285 (D. Colo. Jul. 28, 2016) (requiring transfer
within twenty-eight days); Second Interim Settlement Agreement at ¶ 4, J.H. v. Dallas, No. 1:15cv-02057 (M.D. Penn. Jun. 15, 2017) (“parties will attempt to reach agreement on maximum
allowable wait time”).
28. Martha Bellisle, After Paying $83 Million in Fines, Washington Settles Jail MentalHealth Lawsuit, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 12, 2018, 4:27 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/judge-oks-settlement-in-case-against-washington-state-over-delays-in-mentalcompetency-services/ [https://perma.cc/J92U-EAJM]; see also Allison Sherry, State Agrees to
$10 Million in Fines, Overhaul of How It Handles Mentally Ill in Jail, CPR NEWS (Mar. 16, 2019),
https://www.cpr.org/2019/03/16/state-agrees-to-10-million-in-fines-overhaul-of-how-it-handlesmentally-ill-in-jail/ [https://perma.cc/F64M-7J9D] (describing Colorado’s failures to abide by
previous settlement agreements).
29. The true total is likely far higher because jurisdictions do not keep track of this statistic.
To calculate this number, investigative reporters compiled a database of jail deaths based on
public records. Gary A. Harki, Horrific Deaths, Brutal Treatment: Mental Illness in America’s
Jails,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT
(Aug.
23,
2018,
11:31
AM),
https://pilotonline.com/news/local/projects/jail-crisis/article_5ba8a112-974e-11e8-ba17b734814f14db.html [https://perma.cc/SP3K-TS8P].
30. Id. (noting that 44% of the deaths were suicides and many of the deaths were “under
horrific circumstances”).
31. Jamie Fellner, A Conundrum for Corrections, a Tragedy for Prisoners: Prisons as
Facilities for the Mentally Ill, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 135, 139 (2006); see also RAM
SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF
JAILS
IN
AMERICA
12
(2015),
http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/incarcerations-front-door-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY7Q-NH7Y]
(“Characterized by constant noise, bright lights, an ever-changing population, and an atmosphere
of threat and violence, most jails are unlikely to offer any respite for people with mental illness.”).
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jails because they sustained their own COVID-19 outbreaks or had a wellfounded fear of a new transfer instigating one. While many of those transfers
have resumed, backlogs continue, and detainees who used to wait weeks for
a placement are now told that no beds will open for months. And while they
wait, they remain trapped in close quarters with other detainees, exposed to
the virus in places that have incubated some of the worst outbreaks in the
country.
Yet the severity of the crisis could lead toward decarceration as a solution.
Because of the pandemic, jail populations have dropped, and judges have
even released a handful of defendants found incompetent to stand trial. The
moment has made possible a wholesale rethinking of whom we jail and why,
which could result in a solution to the long-standing problem of mental health
incarcerations.
A. Pandemic as Crisis
Jails and prisons overwhelmingly populate lists of COVID-19 clusters, far
more so than nursing homes or meatpacking plants. As of July 25th, the worst
cluster in the country was at the Marion Correctional Institution in Marion,
Ohio, where 2,443 people were infected.32 That same day, Harris County jail
in Texas had 1,913 cases of COVID-19.33 Over 100,000 people in
correctional facilities have contracted the virus.34 At least 802 inmates and
correctional officers have died.35
This should be no surprise, as it is almost impossible to social distance in
a correctional facility. The ACLU described the situation elegantly in its
complaint suing a federal detention facility for release of prisoners:
[I]magine if someone sick with COVID-19 came into your home
and sealed the doors and windows behind them. That is what the
Oakdale federal detention centers have just done to the over 1,800
human beings currently detained there, where a COVID-19
outbreak is rampant, social distancing is impossible, and no one
detained can leave.36

32. Covid in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html
[https://perma.cc/25AU-JP8M].
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Injunctive, and Declaratory Relief at 1, Livas v.
Meyers, No. 1:20-cv-00422 (W.D. La. Apr. 6, 2020) (footnote omitted).
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At the same time, state mental health facilities, where most competence
restoration occurs, halted transfers from jails.37 The hospitals often became
hotspots themselves. An outbreak at one New Jersey hospital resulted in 194
patients sickened and twelve dead.38 One news organization found that at
least 1,450 cases of COVID-19 were associated with mental health facilities
across twenty-three states and Washington, D.C.39
But these hospital shutdowns left individuals found incompetent stranded
in jails, stuck with no treatment and no safe place to go. In June, Illinois had
ninety-two defendants on a waitlist for admission for inpatient care.40 In
Colorado, the waitlist for competence restoration treatment doubled in midApril.41 In Washington, estimated wait times increased by three months.42
In addition to the simple fact of the waits themselves and the damage they
inflict on those with mental illness, lockdown protocols at many correctional
facilities have kept inmates stuck in the jails in a form of solitary
confinement.43 This, despite the fact that individuals with mental health
conditions are particularly susceptible to the mental health harms solitary
confinement inflicts. For prisoners with mental illness, placing them in
isolation is akin to “putting an asthmatic in a place with little air to breathe.”44
As one doctor testified, isolating prisoners in small cells for twenty-three
hours a day intensifies any preexisting mental illness:
Prisoners who are prone to depression and have had past depressive
episodes will become very depressed in isolated confinement.
People who are prone to suicide ideation and attempts will become
more suicidal in that setting. People who are prone to disorders of
mood, either bipolar . . . or depressive[,] will become that and will
have a breakdown in that direction. And people who are psychotic
in any way . . . those people will tend to start losing touch with
reality because of the lack of feedback and the lack of social

37. See, e.g., Edith Brady-Lunny, State COVID-19 Orders Keep Mentally Ill Inmates in Jail,
WGLT (Jun. 25, 2020), https://www.wglt.org/post/state-covid-19-orders-keep-mentally-illinmates-jail#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/UM5B-VEDX].
38. Thompson, supra note 4.
39. Id.
40. Brady-Lunny, supra note 37.
41. Thompson, supra note 4.
42. Id.
43. Joseph Shapiro, As COVID-19 Spreads in Prisons, Lockdowns Spark Fear of More
Solitary
Confinement,
NPR
(June
15,
2020,
4:53
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/15/877457603/as-covid-spreads-in-u-s-prisons-lockdowns-sparkfear-of-more-solitary-confinemen [https://perma.cc/7XKG-C5JA].
44. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265–66 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding solitary
confinement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for prisoners living with mental health
conditions).
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interaction and will have another breakdown, whichever breakdown
they’re prone to.45

The situation was desperate before the pandemic began. But with both
increased wait times and use of solitary confinement-like techniques, not to
mention the risk of sickness and death from COVID-19, things have gotten
far, far worse.
B. Pandemic as Solution
Yet amid this grim news are signs of hope. The emergency situation has
led to rapid and large reductions in jail populations; the typical jail reduced
its population by more than thirty percent between March and May.46 These
reductions have achieved in a matter of months what reformers have been
attempting for decades. As one public defender said, “This moment has
flipped the script on mass incarceration . . . It’s laid bare that caging huge
swaths of our society isn’t necessary—it’s just convenient.”47
Nowhere is that more true than with defendants living with mental health
conditions. For those found incompetent to stand trial, judges have been
known to jail defendants pending restoration, even if the defendant poses no
public safety risk, and even if the defendant had previously been released on
bail.48
Nonetheless, massive reductions in jail populations have benefitted those
found incompetent to stand trial in two ways. First, when defendants are
released, space is freed up within the facility to better allow for social
distancing. Even if defendants found incompetent to stand trial are not among
those released, they face less risk of contracting the disease simply because
the jail is emptier than it was pre-COVID-19.
Second, defendants found incompetent have been among those released,
although their pending competence proceedings were often an additional
hurdle for them to overcome to obtain release. In Washington, D.C., the
public defenders service sought the release of fifty-seven misdemeanor
45. HUM. RTS. WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS 152 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting testimony of Dr. Terry Kupers in Jones’El v.
Berge, No. 00-C-0421-C (W.D. Wis. 2001)).
46. Emily Widra & Peter Wagner, While Jails Drastically Cut Populations, State Prisons
Have Released Almost No One, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 14, 2020),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/05/14/jails-vs-prison-update/ [https://perma.cc/C99BRAKE].
47. Sarah Stillman, Will the Coronavirus Make Us Rethink Mass Incarceration?, NEW
YORKER (May 18, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/25/will-thecoronavirus-make-us-rethink-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/9PAF-GC2S].
48. Orihuela, supra note 6, 8–9.
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defendants who were being held in competence proceedings either at St.
Elizabeth’s Hospital or D.C. Jail.49 They argued that these defendants should
be released both because they are stuck in competence purgatory with no trial
date in sight and because of the risk to their lives and health in the institutional
settings:
A deprivation of liberty under the circumstances present here—
essentially an undetermined commitment driven toward a trial date
that is no longer pending and a misdemeanor criminal proceeding
that is entirely suspended—in and of itself would be problematic.
The problem is multiplied by the fact that detention not only
infringes on the individual’s liberty, but exposes that individual to
a virus that could have painful or deadly consequences.50

Thirty-five of those fifty-seven people were released; an additional eleven
were released on their criminal charges but were remanded for civil
commitment at St. Elizabeth’s.51
Other anecdotal cases indicate a willingness on the part of judges to
release defendants who would otherwise be stuck in jail for months on end
while hospitals work through the backlog of defendants. One defendant
charged with robbery waited in jail for nearly three months for a transfer to
the state hospital. With no estimate for when a bed would open, the judge
dismissed the charges.52 Another detainee was told he would not likely
transfer until December.53 A judge called the delay “out of the question” and
ordered him released.54
After years of delayed treatment, it must now be clear that more beds will
not open in psychiatric facilities. Even states under the watchful eye of the
judiciary have consistently failed to keep up with the demand for competence
restoration treatment. The solution is not to tinker with this mechanism. As
the pandemic has shown, a better approach is to default to releasing
defendants pending trial.
IV.

NEXT STEPS AND DANGERS

These decarceration trends are a silver lining in a very dark cloud. Many
detainees are sick, many are dead, and, with spikes happening all across the
49. Order, supra note 8, at 2.
50. Omnibus Emergency Motion at 4, In re Misdemeanor-Charged Defendants in
Competency Evaluation or Restoration, No. 2020-CNC-00122 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2020).
51. Order, supra note 8, at app. A, B.
52. Kroman, supra note 9.
53. Id.
54. Id.

216

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Ariz. St. L.J. Online

country, these numbers will only increase. Even if they do not become sick,
defendants found incompetent to stand trial are stuck in limbo in a
dehumanizing place with little hope for recovery. And yet, the emptying of
jails in response to the pandemic is the largest reversal in mass incarceration
trends in recent memory. It presents an opportunity for jurisdictions to
experiment with and move toward a non-carceral model.
But it is easy to fall back into past patterns. When it comes specifically to
people with mental health conditions, two dangers loom: a repeat of the
failures of deinstitutionalization and a quick return to the status quo.
A. Deinstitutionalization Redux
We have seen large releases of individuals with mental health conditions
from confinement before. Beginning in the 1950s, deinstitutionalization took
hold across the country.55 Mental hospitals emptied themselves of residents—
driven by the antipsychotic medication revolution, civil rights lawsuits,
public opinion, and federal funding that covered treatment outside of the
institutional setting56—often with the thinking that the funds states would
save on warehousing people who no longer needed it would follow those
individuals into the community.57
That funding for community treatment centers never materialized.58 To
make matters worse, in the 1980s, federal and state funding for housing and
social security was cut drastically, leaving many vulnerable people without
supports.59
The conventional wisdom is that, as a result of these failures, those with
mental health conditions who were released from institutions mainly wound
up on the nation’s streets and in its jails and prisons. There is some reason to
55. See, e.g., GERALD N. GROB, THE MAD AMONG US: A HISTORY OF THE CARE OF
AMERICA’S MENTALLY ILL 291 (1994).
56. See, e.g., id.
57. See, e.g., ROBERT BERNSTEIN ET AL., BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH L.,
DIVERSION, NOT DISCRIMINATION: HOW IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
CAN HELP REDUCE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN JAILS 6 (2017)
(“[D]einstitutionalization, as a policy or program, was supposed to be linked to and coordinated
with the development of a comprehensive network of community mental health programs that
were intended to replace hospital care and allow people with mental illness to live successfully in
their communities. America failed to deliver on that promise . . . . [O]nly fragments of what was
intended to be a comprehensive system of community mental health services materialized.”
(footnotes omitted)).
58. Id.
59. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2012); BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, MAKING ROOM: THE ECONOMICS OF
HOMELESSNESS 235 (1996).
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question this narrative; researchers have found that the population of those
who lived in institutions and those who became incarcerated do not match
up,60 and broader mass incarceration trends could instead account for some
of the increase in populations with mental illness in jails and prisons.61 Yet,
regardless of whether deinstitutionalization or mass incarceration was the
driver, at least one cause of the mental health crisis in the nation’s jails is
likely the country’s anemic mental health and welfare systems.62
That pattern of release-without-supports is continuing now, and we very
well may see those released from jail fall into homelessness and arrest. But
this should not be counted as a failure of release, if all we do is repeat the
mistakes of deinstitutionalization. Instead, the current situation has provided
an opportunity to begin to realize the unkept promise of community health
centers and local supports. By investing in those individuals we have
released; ensuring they have access to mental health care, substance abuse
treatment, food, housing, and employment opportunities; and supporting
them as they transition back into the community, society could experiment
with a true model for mental health decarceration.
That said, the analogy between decarceration and deinstitutionalization
does not perfectly track. For one, the populations are distinct: individuals
found incompetent to stand trial are generally (but not universally) gravely
disabled, while many (but not all) of those initially released from institutions
may have lived with milder forms of mental illness.63 Outcomes may be far
worse for decarcerated individuals than deinstitutionalized ones. On the other
hand, the criminal justice system has tools at its disposal to encourage
compliance with treatment regimes, like conditions of release, that were
60. See, e.g., Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Assessing the Contribution of the
Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill to Growth in the U.S. Incarceration Rate, 42 J. LEGAL
STUD. 187, 199–208 (2013).
61. See E. Lea Johnston, Reconceptualizing Criminal Justice Reform for Offenders with
Serious Mental Illness, 71 FLA. L. REV. 515, 529 (2019) (“Harsh drug laws and the frequent cooccurrence of mental disorder and substance abuse likely account, at least partially, for the
disproportionate justice involvement of individuals with serious mental illness.”).
62. See Appleman, supra note 21, at 462–63 (arguing that deinstitutionalization has led to
imprisonment of many disabled people in correctional facilities “[i]n large part . . . because
society has not been willing to devote enough resources to ensuring that deinstitutionalization
works”). But see Johnston, supra note 61, at 529–30 (noting that studies have shown that changes
in financing of community services have not “affect[ed] the probability of incarceration for
individuals with mental illness”).
63. See Fredrick E. Vars & Shelby B. Calambokidis, From Hospitals to Prisons: A New
Explanation, 102 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 101, 108 (2017) (noting that “many patients released
before 1980 were older and stable enough to live in nursing homes”); cf. Raphael & Stoll, supra
note 60, at 190, 209 (noting that many of those released early were transferred to nursing homes
and hypothesizing that deinstitutionalization “followed a chronologically selective path, with the
least ill and perhaps the least prone to felonious behavior deinstitutionalized first.”).
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unavailable to the institutions releasing former residents.64 While the affected
populations and mechanisms of deinstitutionalization differ quite
significantly from decarceration, one lesson is surely transferable: providing
those released without any resources at all will almost certainly result in
failure.
Yet even if states do not fund the programs that may lead to successful
returns to communities, decarceration is still a goal worth pursuing. It is not
at all apparent that forcible detention in a place that, at best, will worsen
mental illness and, at worst, could lead to violent harm or death, is a superior
option to homelessness or the other social ills that may befall those living
with mental illness.
B. Retrenchment
Despite the many headlines blaring that “COVID Changed Everything,”65
criminal justice may be slowly falling back into its mass incarceration
patterns. A main driver of reductions in jail populations was fewer arrests and
more pre-trial releases. In Washington, D.C., for example, the police
department instituted a policy converting some crimes that previously would
have resulted in arrest into citations.66 Other jurisdictions, like California,
eliminated money bail for many crimes.67 Some judges and jail administrators
released those serving short sentences for nonviolent offenses.68
64. I make no claim as to whether, normatively, these coercive measures are a superior
approach. I only raise the point that this is a significant difference between the available tools of
deinstitutionalization and the available tools of decarceration.
65. E.g., Shamila Batohi, Opinion, COVID-19 Has Changed Everything from Crime to
Policy. Legal Systems Must Keep Up, GUARDIAN (Jun. 23, 2020, 1:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/commentisfree/2020/jun/23/covid-19-haschanged-everything-from-to-policy-legal-systems-must-keep-up
[https://perma.cc/PH5RELET]; Coronavirus Will Change the World Permanently. Here’s How, POLITICO (Mar. 19, 2020,
7:30 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/19/coronavirus-effect-economylife-society-analysis-covid-135579 [https://perma.cc/U3QF-HKV8].
66. See Amanda Michelle Gomez, To Reduce Lock-Ups, MPD Agrees To Cite More People
During
Coronavirus
Emergency,
WASH.
CITY
PAPER
(Mar.
19,
2020),
https://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/city-desk/article/21123137/to-reduce-lockupsmpd-agrees-to-cite-more-people-during-coronavirus-emergency
[https://perma.cc/XK5MFVRX].
67. Darrell Smith, Judicial Council of California Approves $0 Bail for Low-Level Suspects,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Apr.
8,
2020,
11:15
AM),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/coronavirus/article241817606.html
[https://perma.cc/66L6LQNZ].
68. E.g., Ricardo Torres-Cortez, 115 Clark County Jail Inmates Released To Prevent Virus
Spread,
LAS
VEGAS
SUN
(Apr.
21,
2020,
8:30
PM),
https://lasvegassun.com/news/2020/apr/21/115-clark-county-jail-inmates-released-virus-threa/
[https://perma.cc/R4U3-GJND].
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But in many places, reductions in people entering jail were a matter of
happenstance; in the early days of the pandemic, most people stayed in their
homes, where they were less vulnerable to arrest. As the restrictions on
movement have eased and courts have remained closed or backlogged, the
jail populations began to creep back up. Harris County jail in Houston, Texas,
for example, is nearly back to its pre-pandemic population, despite having
one of the largest outbreaks of COVID-19 in the country.69 At the same time,
the emergency efforts to empty jails that were so common in the early days
of the pandemic have largely ceased. For example, Philadelphia police
suspended low-level arrests at the start of the pandemic; on May 1, it resumed
arrests for property crimes.70
One compilation of jail data for about 350 facilities shows the numbers
inching back up. The population was at over 80,000 on March 16, as the
pandemic took hold.71 At its low point on May 2, the population was 56,164.72
By October 19, it was back above 70,000.73 This slow retrenchment promises
to reverse the gains the emergency made possible.
V.

CONCLUSION

The pandemic has simultaneously harmed defendants found incompetent
to stand trial and revealed new possibilities for solving the long-standing
problem of mental health incarceration. In a short period of time, many
jurisdictions embraced jailing fewer people because jail posed serious risks
to detainees’ health.
Yet jail was nearly as dangerous to people with mental health conditions
before the pandemic as it is now. Even after infections are no longer
rampaging through correctional facilities, the goal of keeping defendants
found incompetent to stand trial out of jail cells should remain. And if we
seize the opportunity we now have to provide supports to defendants upon
their release and experiment with alternatives to jail, we could meaningfully
69. Gabrielle Banks & Samantha Ketterer, Harris County Jail Is Creeping Back Up to PreCOVID Capacity, Officials Warn, HOUS. CHRON. (Jun. 12, 2020, 7:43 PM),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Harris-County-Jail-iscreeping-back-up-to-15337247.php [https://perma.cc/XG47-4EFT].
70. Ellie Rushing & Robert Moran, Philly Police Resume Pre-Coronavirus Arrest
Procedures for Some Non-Violent Crimes, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 1, 2020),
https://www.inquirer.com/news/philadelphia/coronavirus-philadelphia-police-arrests-theftburglary-covid-19-20200501.html [https://perma.cc/4QT4-QXMP].
71. Jail Data Initiative, PUB. SAFETY LAB, https://publicsafetylab.org/jail-data-initiative
[https://perma.cc/T32N-GXCE].
72. Id.
73. Id.
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reform our system so that no future defendants are caught in competence
purgatory.

